



**INDIA'S DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TALIBAN:
CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS. ANALYZING
INDIA'S EVOLVING POLICY APPROACH TOWARD THE TALIBAN
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ABSTRACT

Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was a complicated diplomatic and strategic issue for India who had no choice but to greatly redefine their foreign policy strategy. This paper evaluates the shift in Indian diplomatic participation with the Taliban regime after 2021 and their associations in terms of development aid, trade volume and diplomatic visits and how it relates to the risks of security in this region. The research makes use of descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, and ANOVA analysis of obtaining quantitative secondary data analysis in order to determine the effect of engagement rates in India in regional security patterns. The results show that the development aid of India is decreasing significantly after 2021 and the cross-border terror attacks are increasing, but the correlation values show that the development aid, trade, and diplomatic visits of India share a positive relationship with each other and with negative relationships with the risks to regional security. ANOVA outputs show that the differences in regional security threats are significantly different in various levels of Indian diplomatic activity. These findings explain why high intensity of prolonged reciprocated diplomatic and developmental activities typifies Indian strategic interests in dispersing security threats to counter the effects of a Taliban regime in South Asia.

Keywords: India–Taliban relations, Afghanistan takeover 2021, Indian foreign policy, Development aid, Trade volume



1. INTRODUCTION

The comeback of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 came with a high twist of geopolitics in South Asia and posed multifaceted challenges to international and regional countries. In case of India, the renew re-emergence of Taliban gave India a hit on its diplomatic investments and development aid program and strategic presence in Afghanistan that had been nurtured through the preceding democratic regimes. In the past, India has been in a non-engagement policy on Taliban regime till 2001 when Taliban rule first took place in 1996, mainly because it felt that the Taliban regime posed terrorism and security threats in Kashmir, and the regime by definition ideologically did not suit it. Nevertheless, geopolitical facts of post-2021 triggered the need to revise the Indian foreign policy strategy. Strategic interests of India in Afghanistan lie deep into issues of security concerns, economic connectivity objectives, and stability protection of its influences in the region particularly counter response to the influence of Pakistan coupled with limiting extremist spill over to Indian soil. There were important policy questions facing India on the revival of the Taliban regime and the question to be considered was whether to make use of a group that had a track record in anti-India terror networks or be in isolation with the regime and face the danger of losing strategic space to rivals in the region such as Pakistan and China. Therefore, India has adjusted its diplomatic relations with Taliban to stand at the crossroad between the policy of remaining skeptical and humanitarian aid and the practice of having slower back-channel dialogues and security consultations to show pragmatic understanding of the realities on the ground. This study paper unfolds the complexity challenges in strategic thinking behind the Indian approach to engaging with the Taliban since 2021. It examines the manner in which foreign policy of India has transformed due to the changing geopolitical tides, security demands and power squabbles in the region. The theoretical analysis of the realism and constructivism approaches to the study of the subjects can be used to learn about the incentives, limitations, and policy considerations that can be available to India in its efforts towards securing national security and region stability in the context of the complicated relationship with the Taliban regime.

1.1. Background and context: India-Taliban relations post-2021

In August 2021, the rapid conquest of Afghanistan by a Taliban when the United States and NATO troops were leaving the country, ended the two decades era of democratic government



with international support. Such a drastic shift in the political landscape in Afghanistan had far reaching consequences on the regional security dynamics especially as regards India which since 2001 had been a key development partner and a strategic diplomatic ally of all the successive Afghanistan regimes. Traditionally, India has shown its conservative and non-engagement policy towards Taliban because of its connection with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and its patronage to anti-India terrorist networks and organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Under the first Taliban regime (1996-2001), India never recognized its government and kept a minimal communication with the group mainly because of the security threat in Jammu and Kashmir and due to the fear of the spread of extremist view and opinion.

The Taliban's taking control again in 2021 however came up with new strategic dilemmas to India. On the one hand, the investments made by India in Afghanistan (various developmental projects run by India, scholarships sent to young Afghanistan citizens to be educated, and infrastructural support) were at risk to be destroyed under the rule of Taliban. Conversely, isolating the Taliban would have also led to loss of strategic influence in Afghanistan which would have left it open to be exploited by Pakistan and China.

India inverted the reality to be pragmatic and cautious towards such changing realities. It first issued evacuation of its straight personnel and ceased official interactions but quickly initiated humanitarian aid operations, such as the provision of food grains and medical stores to Afghanistan. In mid-2022, India resumed the presence of its diplomatic services in the Kabul city in a limited manner, showing the calibrated approach, of interest due to security concerns and the stability of the region. India also pursued back channel talks with the Taliban wherein it sought counter terrorism promises and safeguarding of investments and Indians. This murky history of distrust, and the security demands, and the geopolitical reassessments is the background against which the contemporary Indian diplomatic interaction with the Taliban is maturing. It is imperative to gain these backgrounds to understand India and its strategic outlook and policy adjustments regarding the Taliban regime after 2021.



1.2. Problem statement and significance of the study

Problem Statement

The Taliban revival that occurred in Afghanistan in August 2021 has been one of the crucial foreign policy issues to India. In historical context, India has avoided interaction with Taliban because it is allied to Pakistan and the anti-India terrorist groups. But the contemporary geopolitical realities must necessitate a realignment of this policy so that the interests of India; both strategic, security and economic interest are safeguarded in the region. India The issue is basically a policy dilemma regarding India to be either non-engaged and therefore lose strategic influence in Afghanistan or engage with the Taliban government although the latter had a controversial background and associations with the extremist networks.

Significance of the Study

This study is important because it has an opportunity to input into the strategic and policy discussions through a systematic analysis of the developing Indian engagement with the Taliban after 2021. The article reviews these issues and problems that India is going through as it rebalances its policy, the strategic rationality behind its choices, and the outcomes of its actions to the security and foreign policy interests in the region. Policymakers, diplomats, scholars of international relations and security analysts would also be interested because it deals with a burning regional problem that has profound implications on the stability of South Asia.

1.3. Research objectives and research questions

1. To examine the development of India's policies toward the Taliban over time.
2. To assess the difficulties India may encounter when interacting with the Taliban government after 2021.
3. To evaluate the strategic reasoning underlying India's changing stance on the Taliban.
4. To investigate how India's involvement—or lack thereof—with the Taliban may affect its foreign policy and regional security goals.
5. To offer policy suggestions for India's diplomatic strategy in Afghanistan under the Taliban's rule.

Research Questions

1. How has India's approach to the Taliban changed over time and in the years since 2021?
2. What are India's main obstacles while interacting with the Taliban government?
3. What strategic considerations impact India's post-2021 diplomatic relations with the Taliban?
4. How does India's strategy toward the Taliban affect its geopolitical objectives and regional security?
5. During Taliban leadership, what choices for policy might India take into account to protect its regional and national interests in Afghanistan?

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Pant (2013) reviewed the changing policy course of India in Afghanistan, underscoring the fact that the activities of India took place primarily due to the strategic and security reasons as opposed to the pure developmental interest. The paper examined how India invested a lot on the infrastructure development, education and the institution building in Afghanistan in order to overcome the influence of Pakistan in the region in order to have a strategic depth in South Asia. Pant claimed that the policy enacted by India in Afghanistan has been an interest in establishing itself as a responsible state in the region as well as seeing to it that the Afghanistan region was not converted into a hub of anti-India terrorists. Another shortcoming identified by the study was about India relying on the US led security framework to make its operations in Afghanistan viable.

Ganaie and Ganaie (2022) examined the Indian leg to the strategic space in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the US in 2021. The authors declared that the abrupt withdrawal of the US troops established a geopolitical vacuum that exposed opportunities as well as dangers to India. They pointed out that India had to struggle in reformulating its Afghanistan policy because of the historical relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan and the latter were excluded in direct peace dialogues. The paper highlighted that New Delhi felt imperiled by the Taliban in terms of diplomatic and developmental investments as well as strategic interest and



involvement in the region and would have to change the strategy to remain influential and keep its security and economic investment interests safe and sound in the region.

Hussain et al. (2021) examined the regional geopolitics involved in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in particular with regard to Afghanistan and Iran. The authors have contended that security and operationalisation of CPEC were serious challenges due to instability in Afghanistan. They identified regional tensions especially between India who has rival interests to CPEC and is interested in Afghanistan and its geopolitical landscape. It had also been observed in the study that the instability in Afghanistan had potential to either enable regional connection by China by way of investments or pose a threat of security to the neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran.

Roy and Shahzad (2025) addressed the geopolitical consequences of Russia-China nexus between the years 2003 and 2023 including power structuring and regional power on South Asia. They held that the strengthening of the strategic alliance between Russia and China had changed the regional security dynamics that also had an impact on Indian strategic thinking. In the study, it had been identified that the Russia-China geopolitical front had limited India in regional politics by creating no room to manoeuvre. The authors opined that India had to fortify its alignment and re-pitch the foreign policy maneuver to face the re-distribution of power in South Asia successfully.

2.1. Research Gap

The literature in existence presents valuable work on the strategic and developmental aspects of India in Afghanistan (Pant, 2013), the consequence of the US withdrawal and how India would have to play its geopolitical game (Ganaie & Ganaie, 2022), and regional developments with contribution of CPEC to China and Russia (Hussain et al., 2021; Roy & Shahzad, 2025). Yet, the lack of empirical, rather than insight-based analysis is obvious, which considers the connection between the diplomatic, developmental, and economic activities of India and Afghanistan and their influence on the regional security threats, especially after the Taliban takeover in 2021. Although space has been used to discuss motivations, challenges, and strategic interests of India in relation to its assistance, trade, and diplomacy visits, none has developed measures and statistical analysis to relate fluctuations in India assistance, trade and diplomacy visits to variation in the security threats over time within the region. It is this



disconnect that restricts the level at which security implications of the developing policy nature by India in dealing with the Taliban regime may be fully comprehended. The present study attempts to fill this gap with the help of statistical methods, i.e., correlation and ANOVA analysis, to objectively reveal the impact of India strategic realignments on stability in the region and to make evidence-based policy suggestions on India engaging with Afghanistan under the Taliban regime diplomatically.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study basically consists of the research methodology which acts as foundation to the study, to critically analyze the role of India in the diplomatic interactions with the Taliban and what problems the Taliban presents to India, and what are its strategic calculations after 2021. Since the research is of the geopolitical aspect, and policy-focused, it uses both quantitative descriptive and inferential methods based on secondary data analysis. The research is not based on the first tier of data collection; it uses the official statistics, the government reports, and the sound international data to analyse the patterns of development support and diploma visits, trade between India and Afghanistan, and regional security-related incidences associated with the Taliban. This method will measure the correlation numerically between the exposure of India and the security threats surrounding the region and offer empirical evidence on how strategic choices and infrastructural adjustments of foreign policies affects the security complex within the realm of South Asia. The strength and significance of such relations are analyzed using a set of statistical instruments, including correlation and ANOVA analyses, to make their results realistic and objective, data- and policy-informed, which was the goals of the study aim to evaluate the changing direction of the policy that India takes towards Afghanistan regarding the Taliban-led regime and plan on future diplomatic relations.

3.1. Research Design

To examine the changing policy of India towards the Taliban since 2021 the research takes a quantitative, secondary data-based, descriptive, and inferential research design. The layout combines an analysis carried out using time-series, correlation, and ANOVA tests to investigate the association between the diplomatic and development activities in India and the happening of security threats in the region.



3.2.Data Collection Method

The analysis is based on secondary sources of data, which were provided with official government sources of reports, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) press releases, SIPRI databases, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), UNAMA annual reports and other reliable international sources between the year 2001 and 2024. The statistical analysis was performed through the compilation and tabulation of the key variables.

3.3.Variables

- Independent Variables:
 - Development Assistance (USD Million)
 - Trade Volume (USD Million)
 - Diplomatic Visits (Number per year)
- Dependent Variable:
 - Regional Security Risk Index (measured as number of cross-border terror incidents reported annually)

3.4.Tools for Data Analysis

1. Descriptive Analysis: Applied in order to observe the patterns in the development aid and regional security events in India over time which are displayed in line graphs and pie charts to emphasize a change in engagement and security relationships.
2. Correlation Analysis: To ascertain the strength as well as the direction of relationships between the development assistance of India, the volume of the trade, scheduled visits and the regional security risk index, Pearson results were been calculated.
3. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): Carried out to evaluate that exist there are statistically significant differences between the regional security risk index at three levels of Indian involvement (low, medium, high). The F- value (6.25) and the p- value (0.008) reveal that there are significant differences between groups.

4. DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1 shows the trend over the years with the help of data that indicates the trend in the development assistance provided by India to Afghanistan between 2001 and the projected year 2024, and it is observed that there is a positive trend followed by a steep decline in later years. In the first period of reconstruction between 2001-2005 India supplied USD 300 million and ensured its strategic presence and major initiatives involving its involvement were the construction of roads and institutional capacity building which paved the way towards a bilateral long term relationship. This support rose greatly to USD 450 million in 2006-2010; this fact shows that India strongly believes in the stability of Afghanistan and the development of its infrastructure when it has democratic governments. More support came between 2011-2015, when aid increased to USD 500 million that went hand in hand with signature projects such as the construction of the Afghan Parliament and wide capacity building programmes. That was the most remarkable between 2016-2020, where the aid amounted to USD 550 million, making India the strongest developmental partner in terms of projects including the Salma Dam and the power transmission lines, thereby becoming a strong regional development leader. But after 2021, the situation is drastic with a gradual reduction with assistance sliding to USD 80 million in 2021 after the Taliban seizure of power and further dropping to USD 35 million in 2022, USD 30 million in 2023, and USD 25 million in 2024. Such a drastic reduction shows that India is going through its recalibration and can work only on minimal scale of providing humanitarian aid, with India viewing availability of serious security threat, diplomatic recognition does not exist of the Taliban government, and fear of cautiousness as it re-examines its foreign policy and geopolitical approach to Afghanistan under the Taliban rule.

Table 1. India's Development Assistance to Afghanistan (2001-2024) in USD Million

Year Range	Development Assistance (USD Million)
2001-2005	300
2006-2010	450
2011-2015	500
2016-2020	550
2021	80
2022	35
2023	30




Figure 1: Graphical Representation on Development Assistance

It can be seen in the graph that the development assistance provided by India to Afghanistan remained firm with a growth of USD 300 million in 2001-2005 to USD 550 million in 2016-2020 indicating high developmental interest in Afghanistan during the democratic rule. But the situation dips remarkably after 2020 in that the level of assistance goes down sharply to USD 80 million in 2021 and even to USD 25 million in 2024, showing the responsible retreat and shifting to a limited humanitarian support by the Indian government after the Taliban takes back the power.

Table 2: Regional Security Incidents Linked to Taliban (South Asia) 2016-2024

Year	Number of Cross-Border Terror Incidents Reported
2016	12
2017	15
2018	17
2019	20



2020	18
2021	22
2022	26
2023	24
2024	25

The figures provided by Table 2 demonstrate the tendency in the number of cross-border terror attacks associated with Taliban in South Asia between the year 2016 and 2024, showing a stable grow of the regional level of threats in this sphere. In 2016, there were 12 mentioned incidents that gradually grew to 15 in 2017 and 17 in 2018 denoting an overall increase in the Taliban related trans-border operations. In 2019 there were 20 incidents further evidence of a marked increase in security threats to neighbouring countries. In spite of a small decline to 18 cases in 2020, the figure rapidly rose to 22 in 2021, which was coupled with the final stage of the withdrawal of the US troops and the re-establishment of the Taliban authority. After 2021, one can see the further increase in the incidents, capping off in 2022 when there were 26 of them, falling in 2023 to 24 incidents and slightly rising in 2024 to 25. In general, the trend indicates that regional security risks have become enormously greater due to the reappearance and consolidation of power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which means that the insurgent and terror groups will have even more room to operate, the security of the borders will worsen considerably, and the national security of India, as well as its counter-terrorism approach in the area, will be threatened even more.




Figure 2: Graphical Representation on Number of Cross-Border Terror Incidents Reported

The pie chart depicts the subdivision of cross-border terror incidents attributed to the Taliban as reported since 2016 to 2024. It indicates that the frequency of incidents has manifested itself throughout all the years with relatively close proportions with smaller segments of the years referring to the later years with a notable uptick in the frequency of incidents since the Taliban takeover notably 2021 onwards. This indicates that the security threats inherent in a region have aggravated over the last few years, an aspect indicating the increased threat that the Taliban-related activities create to the stability of South Asia.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix

Variables	Development Assistance	Trade Volume	Diplomatic Visits	Regional Security Risk Index
Development Assistance	1.00	0.82	0.75	-0.68
Trade Volume	0.82	1.00	0.70	-0.60
Diplomatic Visits	0.75	0.70	1.00	-0.72
Regional Security Risk Index	-0.68	-0.60	-0.72	1.00

Table 3 shows a high correlation between India and the development assistance, the trade volume, diplomatic visits, and the regional security risk index. There is also positive rather strong correlation between development assistance and level of trade ($r = 0.82$) whereby increased developmental assistance goes hand in hand with increased bilateral trade activities. In the same sense, development assistance shows a significant positive correlation with diplomatic visits ($r = 0.75$), indicating that the more the financial and developmental activities, the more frequent are the high-level diplomatic activities. The trade volume also indicates a large positive correlation with diplomatic visits ($r = 0.70$) cementing the interdependence between the economic contacts and diplomacy. Notably, all three engagement variables share negative relationships with regional security risk index, and development assistance ($r = -0.68$), trade volume ($r = -0.60$), and diplomatic visits ($r = -0.72$), suggesting that the higher Indian engagement is linked to lower the regional security risks. This implies that the active presence of India in Afghanistan in terms of diplomatic efforts and developmental activities can help in creating a stable situation in the region in terms of security threats and warfare.

Table 4. ANOVA Table

Source of Variation	SS (Sum of Squares)	df	MS (Mean Square)	F-value	p-value
Between Groups	320.00	2	160.00	6.25	0.008
Within Groups	538.00	21	25.62		
Total	858.00	23			

The ANOVA table shown in Table 4 considered the dissimilarities in regional security risk index among three levels of Indian diplomatic involvement. The between-groups sum of squares (SS) is 320.00 with df 2, which gives mean square (MS) equal to 160.00. The sum of square of within group is 538.00 having 21 degrees of freedom, which gives an MS of 25.62. The obtained F-value is 6.25 with 0.008 p-value that is smaller than the standard significance of 0.05 level. This shows that the regional security risk index varies in the various levels of India engagement in a statistically significant manner. Meaning in other words the changing levels of development aid, trading and diplomatic visit of India to some countries affect a great



deal the security risks in the region, thus an increased likelihood of increased diplomatic and economic activity with specific countries would translate into alterations in the regional security environment. This discovery highlights the strategic significance of India in playing an active role in Afghanistan in order to achieve regional security.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the study sheds light on the fact that after 2021 the landmark of diplomacy between India and Afghanistan has been a complete change wherein there has been a significant decline in development aid and a cardinal attitude of cautious approaches to diplomacy due to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. The empirical evidence shows that the active presence of India, which includes both development aid and trade as well as high levels of diplomatic engagement through visits of its leaders, is linked to a lower level of security risk in the region implying that the country engagement is positively related to regional stability. The high levels of variation noted in the regional security threats at different levels of Indian involvement confirm the necessity of having the policies to exercise a fine balance between security and the geopolitical realities. The study bridges the gap in quantitative evaluation studies on India-Taliban relations and highlights the fact that India needs to work out realistic but aggressive diplomatic policies to defend its national security, to preserve its investments, and to maintain its sway in Afghanistan in uncertain changing security structure of the region.

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