



## **Beyond the Border: The Continuing Strain Between India and Pakistan**

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### **Abstract**

The relationship between India and Pakistan has remained one of the most complex and enduring rivalries in South Asia since their partition in 1947. Rooted in historical grievances, territorial disputes, ideological differences, and security dilemmas, bilateral relations have been persistently marked by conflict, mistrust, and intermittent dialogue. This paper critically examines the evolution of Indo-Pak relations through a historical and analytical lens, highlighting key issues such as the Kashmir dispute, nuclearization, cross-border terrorism, and the role of extra-regional powers. It explores how differing worldviews, domestic political structures, military influence, and international alignments have shaped the foreign policies of both states. The study also assesses major peace initiatives and confidence-building measures, including bilateral agreements, diplomatic summits, and the role of the United Nations, while evaluating their limited success in achieving lasting stability. By analyzing both conflict and cooperation, the paper argues that despite nuclear deterrence reducing the likelihood of full-scale war, unresolved political disputes and strategic mistrust continue to undermine regional peace. The paper concludes that sustainable peace between India and Pakistan requires sincere political will, meaningful dialogue, reduction of external interference, and a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, particularly concerning Kashmir, in order to ensure long-term stability and development in South Asia.



## INTRODUCTION

Certain important historical and geographic compulsions, which surfaced at the time of the partition of India in 1947, have had a significant bearing on the thinking of both the countries. Islam was considered as a rallying point for the national unity of a people who claimed to hold a different national identity. It became a separatist force that was not in line with the national mainstream of anti-colonial struggle. This has been accepted as a root cause of the creation of Pakistan. India's foreign policy, like that of any other country, is the result of a complex interplay of several factors, most notably its history, geography, power potential, ethos, and polity. These have beckoned India towards the adoption of a resolutely independent foreign policy, outside any alliance system, based on a sense of empathy and solidarity with the developing countries, particularly in Asia and Africa. The inherently tolerant and resilient Indian ethos, marked by the absence of any hegemonistic and territorial ambitions, propelled it towards a democratic, secular and federal polity and equally influenced its fervent advocacy of peaceful coexistence and the resolution of differences through dialogue. The practical underpinning for such an approach lay in the recognition that peace was essential for rapid economic progress—a prerequisite for taking its teeming masses out of poverty.

In view of the foregoing, it is no surprise that the establishment of close and friendly ties with its immediate neighbours has always been high on India's priority list. Its relations with its neighbours have been coloured by the concept of Panchsheel, which entails respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. However, beyond this, India's vision for South Asia is that it should enjoy the freest possible movement of people, goods and services across state boundaries, as is the case in Europe. Visas should become redundant or at least much easier to obtain, cross-border trade and investments should be the norm, joint ventures should flourish, and a South Asian identity should be more recognisable. This is India's hope and endeavour within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) framework. Though progress in this direction has been slow, India has registered considerable success bilaterally in taking its relationships with some of its neighbours like Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to new highs.

Regrettably, such success has not been replicated in India-Pakistan relations. It continues to be marred by differences and distrust although India has always wanted friendly and good neighbourly ties with Pakistan and remains committed to progressing them through dialogue. Since prominent Pakistani leaders, like former President Musharraf and former Foreign Minister Kasuri, have claimed that the differences on major issues had been virtually resolved on the back channel, it would be logical to assume that the root of the rocky relationship between the two countries lies not on such differences but on Pakistan's inimical mindset towards India.<sup>1</sup> Such a mindset has, through the years, been promoted by the establishment in need of the Indian bogey in order to keep the country together, to avoid ceding genuine power to the democratic forces, and to ensure that it continues to call the shots in perpetuity.<sup>2</sup> No wonder, therefore, that Pakistan today repudiates the understandings reportedly arrived at on the back channel.<sup>3</sup>

India and Pakistan were born out of a bloody partition that encouraged each to define itself in opposition to the other. Six decades after the tragedy and trauma of partition, a host of issues continue to bedevil India-Pakistan relations and cast long shadows on bilateral ties. Pakistan perceives that India has hegemonic ambition in South Asia. Pakistan as the primary bargainer, has the potential to check Indian dominance or hegemonic aspirations. Pakistan is neither strong enough to assert itself effectively against India nor it is so weak that it can readily submit in a subordinate position. Immediately after partition, there was a lot of confidence in Pakistan that the Muslim countries of the world would draw closer to Pakistan and indeed might move towards a Pan Islamic grouping of Muslim nations. Islam and Muslim brotherhood appeared to Pakistan as the only bond of belonging in whose name she could appeal for other nation's support against India.

## **A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS**

Pakistan was born out of the partition of India in 1947. It was created to meet the demands of Indian Muslims 'for their own homeland.' At the time, Pakistan consisted of two distinct

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<sup>1</sup> Steve Coll, "The Back Channel," *The New Yorker*, March 2, 2009; also Gen Pervez Musharraf's interview to NDTV, accessed at <http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-and-pakistan-were-close-to-a-kashmir-solution-musharraf-to-ndtv-58500?cp>

<sup>2</sup> B.K. Nehru, *Nice Guys Finish Second* (Penguin Books India, 2000), p. 58; Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (Columbia: Huist, 2009), p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Shah Mehmood Qureshi's policy statement in Parliament *The News*, May 5, 2010

regions: the East Wing or present-day Bangladesh is on the Bay of Bengal bordering India and Burma and the West Wing or present day Pakistan stretches from the Himalayas down to the Arabian Sea.<sup>4</sup>

Accordingly, in 1947, the Dominion of Pakistan, comprising West Pakistan with provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the East Pakistan with province of Bengal, became independent.

The armed intrusions into the Kashmir by tribesmen from the NWFP led the Maharaja of Kashmir to seek military help from India. The Maharaja signed accession papers in 1947 and allowed Indian troops. Pakistan refused to recognize the accession.<sup>5</sup> Pakistan became a parliamentary democracy and in 1956 Pakistan and was renamed as Islamic Republic of Pakistan. When Pakistan became a republic, Governor General Iskander Mirza became its President. In 1958, President Iskander Mirza, with the support of the Army, suspended the 1956 constitution imposed martial law and cancelled the scheduled polls. The Army sent him into exile and Mohammad Ayub Khan assumed control of a military dictatorship. Khan resigned in 1969 and handed over power to the Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, who became President and Chief Martial Law Administrator.<sup>6</sup>

General elections held in 1970 polarized relations between the Eastern and Western section of Pakistan. The Awami League, which advocated autonomy for the more populous East Pakistan swept the East Pakistan elections to gain a majority in Pakistan as a whole, while the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP), founded and led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, won a majority of the seats in West Pakistan. When negotiations to form a coalition government broke down, a civil war ensued. With the support of India, East Pakistan became independent in 1971 as Bangladesh, Yahya Khan resigned and Bhutto became President and the first Civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. In 1970, Bhutto promulgated a new constitution and relinquished the presidency to become Prime Minister. When Bhutto proclaimed his own victory in the 1977 election, he was arrested by the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) leadership. Mohammad Zial-ul-Haq seized power and Bhutto was convicted and sentenced to death. Zia

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<sup>4</sup> S.K. Chaturvedi, S.K. Sharma, Mahendra Kumar (ed.), "Encycloepadia of SAARC", Vol. 2, SAARC: Member Nations, Pragun Publication, 2006, p.230.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. pp. 236



assumed the presidency and banned political activity in 1979. Zia died later in 1988 in an air crash.

The 1988 elections were won by the PPP and Benazir Bhutto formed a coalition government. President Khan dismissed the Bhutto Government in 1990 and after the new elections; Mohammad Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister. Government was quite successful, but in 1993, Khan sacked the Nawaz Sharif Government.<sup>7</sup> The 1993 elections were won by the PPP and Benazir Bhutto formed a coalition government. However, in 1996 Leghari dismissed the Bhutto Government, charging it with corruption and implication in extrajudicial killings in Karachi. The 1997 elections were won by the Nawaz faction of the PML and consequently he formed the government. In 1999, Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf grabbed power in a military coup declaring himself as “Chief Executive” of Pakistan. In 2001, Tarar quit and Musharraf became President.

A parliamentary model was introduced in 2002. Pakistan passed a law enabling Musharraf to retain both the President as well as Army Chief’s posts. Its population is 157 million (UN 2004) and area is 796, 095 sq. Km. (307,374 sq. miles) (excluding Pakistani-held parts of Kashmir). Its main exports are textile products, rice, cotton, leather goods. Agriculture is the mainstay of Pakistan’s economy employing almost 50 percent of the population. The country is now self-sufficient in food supply. Pakistan’s industrial base is able to supply many of the country’s need in consumer goods, although production has slowed in recent years.<sup>8</sup> India–Pakistan relations have been marked by conflicts and tensions ever since their independence sixty years ago. The conflict was largely a result of the fears, jealousies and rivalries that marked the political process at work in India before freedom and culminated in the partition of the sub-continent. After independence, Pakistan’s foreign policy perceived India as the main threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity; a country which was out to undo Pakistan. During partition the quick fix arrangement left a host of political, social and economic controversies which have cast a shadow on the relationship of the two countries ever since.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid. 99. 232

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 239-40

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

The demarcation of the boundaries by Sir Cyril Radcliff, the division of assets by various joint commissions and other unresolved problems left a trail of bitterness on both sides. Not the least among these was the fate of the princely states, which included the controversial states of Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the period, there were attempts on both sides to hold dialogues, to resolve problems wherever possible and to undertake Confidence Building Measures albeit on a smaller scale. Many contentious problems were resolved. The Nehru-Liaquat Agreement of 1951 sought to resolve problem of minorities in the two countries. The Nehru-Mohammad Ali meetings of Karachi and New Delhi were held on 25 July and 16 August 1953. The signing of Indus Water Treaty 1960, the Tashkent Declaration in 1966 and the Simla Agreement of 1972 are examples of conflict resolution.

During the NDA period, India's basic approach towards Pakistan was underlined by then Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's declaration that a stable, prosperous and secure Pakistan was in India's interest. On 11<sup>th</sup> May/May 11, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokharan range in Rajasthan. India also tested the Trishul Missile, a short range triple missile, having a capability of being used as a surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile at the Interiors Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur (Orissa).<sup>11</sup> On 13<sup>th</sup> May, India conducted two more nuclear tests at Pokharan. On 15 May in an interview to India Today Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that India was now a nuclear weapons state. Our nuclear policy was marked by restraint exercised for twenty four years after having demonstrated our capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example.

The action involved was balanced in that/justified, as it was the minimum necessary to maintain what is an irreducible component of India's national security calculus. Subsequently, Indian government had already amounted/declared that India would observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions.<sup>12</sup>

India's strengthened capacity adds to her sense of responsibility. Indians do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country. These are weapons

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<sup>10</sup>Sisir Gupta, "Kashmir : A Study in India-Pakistan Relations," Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1967, p.1.

<sup>11</sup>Dr. C.P. Thakur, Devendra P. Sharma, "India under Atal Bihari Vajpayee: The BJP Era," UBS Publishers Distributors Ltd., New Delhi, p. 185

<sup>12</sup>"Nuclear India is Now A Reality, Not a Conferment We Seek," India Perspective 1998, "Following is the text of the Statement made by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament, "Evolution of India's Nuclear policy," on May 27,1998, p.5.



of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threat or coercion. India/We does/do not intend to engage in an arms race.<sup>13</sup> India maintained effective export controls on nuclear material as well as related technology even though it was neither a party of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSGs).<sup>14</sup> India was vigorously pursuing the policy of exploring the power of the atom for peaceful purposes only. It is harnessing nuclear energy for a variety of applications in its developmental and welfare programmes to make the country self-reliant in every sphere. India's nuclear tests at Pokharan in May 1998 have had such a profound impact on the sub-continent that it had changed India's attitude to her technology, economics, politics, defence, environment and perhaps even her attitude to life itself. Increased focus on nuclear disarmament as the only comprehensive and durable non-proliferation measure would be the biggest gain from India's exercise of its nuclear option. India's acquisition of nuclear weapons would sustain polycentric equilibrium in the world at large and Asia in particular. Indians ability to ensure its own self defence and to stand up to any political coercion and arm twisting was an essential element in the evolving polycentricism of the international order. As much as India's non-alignment had moderated the cold war, its continued pursuit of moderate and independent foreign policy backed by its ability to protect its autonomy and core interests would be important factors in the evolving strategic environment. Indian nuclear tests in May and the formal declaration of its nuclear weaponization is perhaps the most radical foreign and defence policy decision taken since it became an independent Republic in August 1947.

India had affirmed to itself and confirmed to the world its status as a full-fledged nuclear weapon state. India had acquired a fresh strategic position as a balancing factor both in regional and international power equations. India in that post-nuclear testing phase was to convince the international community of its nuclear weapons capacity and to underline that this capacity was only to meet India's security requirements. Secondly, that this capacity will be managed with restraint and responsibility, posing no threat to peace and stability. In the wake of the tests, some countries withdrew their Ambassadors and High Commissioners from India. It was an exercise in blatant hypocrisy, given those countries continued to have relations with other nuclear weapon states closer to their territories and whose nuclear capacities provided a

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, pp. 4-5.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, pp. 3



security umbrella to those countries. It was obvious that the five nuclear weapon powers would not respond to the Indian aspiration of seeking the legal status of a “Nuclear Weapons Power”, as it would threaten their carefully structured political strategic considerations to create a non-proliferation order to ensure their dominance in the nuclear world. With the passage of time, political and strategic compulsions brought the nuclear weapon powers to come to terms with the reality of India’s nuclear weapons status. India becoming a nuclear weapon state does not in any way diminish her commitment to global nuclear disarmament.

On 6<sup>th</sup> April 1998, Pakistan announced the successful test of a ballistic missile, the Hatf V (Ghauri). Pakistan also announced that it had conducted tests of six nuclear devices on 28-30 May 1998. It said that the tests were in reaction to India’s nuclear tests carried out earlier in May 1998. The tests by India and Pakistan are in fact, efforts to seek equal participation of the so-called Third World in the New World Order. The possession of credible nuclear deterrent capabilities of China, India and Pakistan has virtually eliminated the probability of war in the region.<sup>15</sup> In response to these tests, Government of India’s official spokesperson said that this event vindicated India’s assessment regarding the nature of programme and policy as well as the measures India had taken. Overt nuclear weapon postures in the region had now ensured that if a war took place in the region, it would remain limited because of the risk of rapid escalation and the impact of the nuclear weapon factor. He also said that Government of India had taken all steps necessary for safeguarding the nation’s security. During the Indian Prime Minister’s meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in New York on 23 September 1998, the Foreign Ministers had reached an agreement on the modalities of the dialogue process. The subjects for the dialogue were agreed upon in June 1997, were Peace and Security, including, CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, Economic and Commercial Cooperation, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields. During talks on peace and security including CBMs in New Delhi in November 1998, India drew Pakistan’s attention to India’s security needs, which were a function of its size and assets. As the pre-eminent power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, New Delhi could not confine its military preparedness to the Western border alone. Its concerns extend thousands of kilometres beyond its land and sea frontiers. In this context, India

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<sup>15</sup>Jasjit Singh, Air Commander, Director Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, “Summer of 98: Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India,” India Perspective, 1998, The New Delhi, p.37

proposed the upgrading of existing CBMs and the need to put in place new CBMs, ranging from information exchange and improved communication links to exchange view on security concepts and nuclear doctrines. India also emphasized the need to build mutual confidence in the nuclear and conventional field. India had suggested a number of confidence building measures relating to attack on nuclear facilities and population centres and economic targets, regarding first use of nuclear capability, additional communication links between their respective armed forces, operational headquarters, and other similar steps. Pakistani stand had been that the core issue, i.e. the Kashmir problem should be resolved first and other issues could only be taken up later. This has led to a situation where even those problems where agreements/consensus had been arrived at, actual signing and implementation of agreements is kept in abeyance.<sup>16</sup> During discussions on Jammu and Kashmir, India made it clear that the legal status of Jammu and Kashmir, i.e. that the entire state is an integral part of India, is clear and does not admit of any change.

The accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India was legal and complete but it was unacceptable to Pakistan in 1947. The Government of Pakistan calls it the core issue and regards it as the unfinished agenda of partition. To India, legally it is an integral and inalienable part. India also demanded that Pakistan ceases its futile instigation and sponsorship of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir henceforth, which constituted a flagrant violation of provisions of the Simla Agreement. The Pakistan Government supports the irregulars as a relatively cheaper way to keep Indian forces tied down.<sup>17</sup> Although the irregulars may serve Pakistan's interest in Kashmir when they target the Indian army, they also kill civilians and indulge in terrorism in violation of the international norms. There are reports of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan indulging in utilization of drug money to fund the terrorist organizations operating against India.

During talks on the Tulbul Navigation Project, India drew Pakistan's attention to an understanding that had been reached during earlier discussions on this subject, which could be the basis for a resolution of the issue. A draft agreement had been agreed upon between the two

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<sup>16</sup>Nalini Kant Jha, "India's Foreign policy in a Changing World," South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 2000, p. 159

<sup>17</sup>.K. Subrahmanyam, "Keep Talking to Pakistan: But Formulate Realistic Strategies," The Times of India, July 30, 2001.

sides in 1991 in Islamabad.<sup>18</sup> Pakistani reservations about the project stemmed from the security aspects of the barrage. They also suspected Indian motives in a project which could lead to India controlling the Jhelum's flow into Pakistan. During discussions on Siachen, India stressed the need for a ceasefire as a first step. On the subject of Sir Creek, India proposed that pending agreement on the land boundary and the maritime boundary could be demarcated, beginning with the maritime boundary and then proceeding landwards. As far as the demarcation of the land boundary in the Sir Creek is concerned, two rounds of talks were held in 1991 and 1992 leading to a consensus between the two sides. India has proposed a fixed boundary around the middle of the Creek along the 1914 resolution map. India has also made concrete proposals regarding the maritime boundary.<sup>19</sup> At the discussions on Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, India gave Pakistan detailed evidence regarding its role in sponsoring terrorism against India and demanded that Pakistan close down training camps for terrorists and hand over terrorists and fugitives from the law who have been given sanctuary in Pakistan. Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) has in fact, spread a network of Islamic terrorists all over the country to disrupt and damage India's peace, progress and stability. The most significant high level engagement between the two countries in over a quarter of a century was India's Prime Minister's historic initiative of travelling to Lahore on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore-Delhi bus service in February 1999.<sup>20</sup> The bus service between Lahore and Delhi was not a means only to ease travel from one country to another. The running of the bus between the two countries symbolizes the desire of the people to improve relations and come together. The Indian Prime Minister and his Pakistani counterpart signed the Lahore Declaration, which is a landmark document for peace, and security between the two countries and has the potential of becoming the elusive template for an improvement in the estranged bilateral relationship.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's dramatic foray into Lahore was undoubtedly the boldest diplomatic initiative undertaken by an Indian politician since Jawaharlal Nehru gave a concrete shape to non-alignment at Bandung in 1955.<sup>21</sup> It is significant that apart from consultations on

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<sup>18</sup> J.N. Dixit, "Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: India-Pakistan Relations: 1970-1994," New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1995, n.7, p.315.

<sup>19</sup> Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, Vol. 47. no.1

<sup>20</sup> India Perspective, March 1999, Joint Statement, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> "First Milestone of a Long Yatra," Media Reaction, The Pioneer (India), India Perspective, March 1999, p.26.



security concepts and nuclear doctrines there will be advance notification of ballistic missile flight tests. Taken together these agreements allowed India and Pakistan to begin the process of mutual strategic restraint encompassing nuclear weapons and missiles, which might offer a model for subsequent Southern Asian mutuality that would bring China on board as well with the potential to make such restraint a global norm.

There have been numerous attempts to improve the relationship—notably, the Shimla summit, the Agra summit and the Lahore summit. Since the early 1980s, relations between the two nations soured particularly after the Siachen conflict, the intensification of Kashmir insurgency in 1989, Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 and the 1999 Kargil war. Certain confidence-building measures, such as the 2003 ceasefire agreement and the Delhi–Lahore Bus service – were successful in de-escalating tensions. However, these efforts have been impeded by periodic terrorist attacks. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack almost brought the two nations to the brink of a nuclear war. The 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings, which killed 68 civilians (most of whom were Pakistanis), was also a crucial point in the relations. Additionally, the 2008 Mumbai attacks carried out by Pakistani militants<sup>22</sup> resulted in a severe blow to the ongoing India-Pakistan peace talks.

After a brief thaw following the election of new governments in both nations, bilateral discussions stalled again after the 2016 Pathankot attack. In September 2016, a terrorist attack on an Indian military base in Indian-administered Kashmir, the deadliest such attack in years, killed 19 Indian Army soldiers. India's claim that the attack had been orchestrated by a Pakistan-supported *jihadist* group was denied by Pakistan, which claimed that the attack had been a local reaction to unrest in the region due to excessive force by Indian security personnel. The attack sparked a military confrontation across the Line of Control, with an escalation in ceasefire violations and further militant attacks on Indian security forces. As of December 2016, the ongoing confrontation and an increase in nationalist rhetoric on both sides have resulted in the collapse of bilateral relations, with little expectation that they will recover.

Since the election of new governments in both India and Pakistan in the early 2010s, some steps have been taken to improve relations, particularly in developing a consensus on the

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<sup>22</sup> J.N. Dixit, “Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: India-Pakistan Relations: 1970-1994,” New Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1995, n.7, p.315.



agreement of Non-Discriminatory Market Access on Reciprocal Basis (NDMARB) status for each other, which will liberalize trade. In the late 2015, meetings were held between the foreign secretaries and the national security advisers of both nations, at which both sides agreed to thoroughly discuss hurdles remaining in the relationship. In November 2015, the new Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif agreed to the resumption of bilateral talks; the following month, Prime Minister Modi made a brief, unscheduled visit to Pakistan while en route to India, becoming the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Pakistan since 2004. Despite those efforts, relations between the countries have remained frigid, following repeated acts of cross-border terrorism. Now, the Modi regime has cut off ties and denied to enter into dialogue unless Pakistan shows a credible effort to curb terrorism from its soil.

## **WORLD VIEWS**

India and Pakistan, as two core countries of South Asia had different worldviews that determined their foreign policies. During the early years after independence, the Indian worldview had been dominated by concerns about building a regional identity amongst the post-colonial nations of Asia. One of the most important aspects of this policy was opposition to the extra regional intervention in South Asia. India sought to keep the South Asian issues within the ambit of South Asian countries. Opposition to the entry of Cold War alliances in Asia and eventual path of non-alignment was a part of this worldview. The period from 1947 to 1971 saw two trends in India's approach towards South Asia. One was initiated by Nehru and focused on regionalism as the dominant theme. The second emerged during the Lal Bahadur Shastri years. This came in the aftermath of the 1962 war and the need for resetting the Indian worldview keeping in mind its capabilities. Shastri was to stress on bilateralism as the key to foreign policy, especially in relation to South Asian countries. It is in the post-1971 period that India developed a coherent South Asia policy that was to determine India's approach towards its South Asian neighbours. The base of this policy lay in India's power status in South Asia. The architecture of the policy rested on a combination of two approaches: regionalism that was now restricted to South Asia and the consequent perception of South Asia as a regional state system; and bilateralism, which was the basis of the Simla Agreement of 1972.



Pakistan's perception of its role emerged from the realisation of two simultaneous factors—the geopolitics of the country that was divided between East and West Pakistan and the Islamic worldview. The former placed Pakistan firmly in the South Asian regional state system while the latter brought it close to the Islamic world of West Asia. Pakistan thus saw itself as a nation with two distinct identities and roles, that of a South Asian power and that of an Islamic West Asian power that was to eventually emerge as an important country of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. One of the dominant security concerns that Pakistan sought to address right from its inception is the fear of India. The problem of Pakistan's foreign and defence policy revolved around this central theme of Indian domination and safeguards that were to be instituted to counter this threat. Pakistan's attempts to establish linkages with the Islamic world and China and to participate in the military alliances of the United States can be understood within this security concern of Pakistan. These links provided an opportunity for Pakistan to counteract India's desire to dominate in what India considered its sphere of influence.

### **SOME AREAS OF CONFLICTS**

India and Pakistan are the two largest countries of South Asia. Since their independence in 1947, the relations between the two countries have been in the state of constant flux. Several decades of armed conflict, bilateral talks and gradually rising trust deficit have become distinctive features of mutual Indo-Pakistan relations. Even though they share linguistic, cultural, geographic, and economic links, their relationship has been plagued by hostility and suspicion. Both India and Pakistan hold different views regarding their conflict; to Pakistan it is Kashmir, whereas for India it is Cross-border terrorism across the LOC, supported by Pakistan

### **Kashmir Issue**

South Asia is undoubtedly one of the most war-prone regions in the world with two neighbours engaged in unresolved conflict over Kashmir. Kashmir dispute more than anything else has exacerbated the bitterness in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan is rooted in the 1947 communal partition of the subcontinent. For India, Kashmir is an integral part of its union; while for Pakistan, Kashmir is a disputed land. For Pakistan, Kashmir with its Muslim majority state should have acceded



to Pakistan according to two nation theory. It describes Kashmir as an “unfinished agenda of partition” of the subcontinent in 1947 viz. that the contiguous Muslim-majority areas, like Kashmir, would constitute Pakistan. On the other hand, India is rejecting the philosophy of partition, namely, separation on the basis of religion. However, it needs to be highlighted here that such policy was not applied by India in the case of Junagarh and Hyderabad state. India maintains that Kashmir had become a part of India when Kashmir’s ruler Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of Accession acceding Kashmir to India. Thus, India’s claim on Kashmir is based on this legal document. On the other hand, Pakistan contends that India is validating its occupation in Kashmir by claiming that the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir had opted for India by signing the Instrument of Accession.<sup>23</sup> For India, Kashmir is an unfinished "agenda of partition" which can be fulfilled only after the areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Northern Gilgit and Baltistan are integrated with India.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, from India’s standpoint, integration of Kashmir is important not only because of its strategic significance but also because its disintegration would have a spill over effect on other states leading to the balkanisation of the Indian Union. For Pakistan, the Kashmir issue is not only crucial for its religious ideology, but is also useful in raising the external threat of India ready to wage an armed conflict because of Kashmir. General Musharraf in a speech on January 12, 2002, summed up the centrality of Kashmir in Pakistan’s jihadi policy. He said, “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. entire Pakistan and the world know this. We will continue to extend our moral, political, and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principal stand on Kashmir”.<sup>25</sup> For Pakistan, Kashmir has far greater importance for economic, ethnic, and strategic reasons. The World Community got involved in this matter when Kashmir Issue was referred to the UN Security Council by India as a complaint against Pakistan on 1 January 1948 in the wake of the invasion of tribes men in Kashmir. Pakistan filed a counter-complaint in the UN. In January 1949, the UN Security Council ordered a cease-fire and passed a resolution for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide its fate.<sup>26</sup> Till date plebiscite could not take place in Kashmir. The resolution recommended Pakistan to withdraw all troops from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir as a pre-

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<sup>23</sup>Shahid M Amin. (2000). Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal. Pakistan: Oxford University Press

<sup>24</sup> Sangeeta Thapliyal. IDSA, available at [www.idsa-india.org](http://www.idsa-india.org)

<sup>25</sup>Ashutosh Misra. (2010). India-Pakistan: Coming to Terms. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp - 42

<sup>26</sup> Abdul Sattar. (2003). Fifty Years of Kashmir Dispute: The Diplomatic Aspect. in Gupta K.R (Ed). India Pakistan Relations with Special Reference to Kashmir, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors.



requisite for holding a plebiscite; Pakistan ignored the UN mandate, did not withdraw its troops and claimed the withdrawal of Indian forces was a pre-requisite as per this resolution.<sup>27</sup> Kashmir attracts the global community's attention from time to time, but no concrete steps have been taken to resolve the problem. This contested issue remains one of the crucial problems in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The unresolved dispute has also been a major drain on the resources of the two countries and has been an obstacle to normalizing relations between them. In 1972, India and Pakistan signed Simla Agreement, by which both countries agreed to settle all issues by peaceful means using mutual dialogue in accordance with the UN charter. Pakistan's efforts over the time to internationalize the Kashmir issue were not appreciated by India. India is demanding the issue to be resolved through bilateral negotiations as per the Simla agreement. Any attempt of third party intervention is widely criticized by India. In the post Simla agreement period, International community has treated Kashmir as a bilateral issue to be discussed at the negotiating table by India and Pakistan. The US position has also been to resolve the Kashmir dispute based on the Simla Agreement. However, after the conduct of nuclear tests by both countries, the American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said that the US was "re-examining the underlying political problems between India and Pakistan including Kashmir". The dynamics of Kashmir rivalry has entered in to the new escalation-prone phase at the turn of the century. India and Pakistan went overtly nuclear in May 1998 when India conducted five nuclear tests and Pakistan responded by conducting six nuclear tests to match India's number of nuclear explosions.

### **Nuclear Issue**

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had generated a great deal of debate on the rationale and implications of these actions taken by both the governments. Much of the debate focused on the security considerations of this action, the regional threat dimensions and internal political compulsions. The Indian articulation focused on the threats from Pakistan and China, while Pakistan targeted India. The central questions raised about the Indian tests had been in the 'why' and 'why now' category. The debates used two distinct paradigms for analysis, the first using the security rationale and the second, the developmental rationale. The

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<sup>27</sup>Sugunakara Raju S.R.T.P. (2011). India-Pakistan Relations and the US Factor. New Delhi: Alter Notes Press



debates based on the first focused on the perceived threats from the regional order as manifested by Pakistan and China. The positions about the exact nature of threats and the methods of tackling these threats would vary from party to party at the political level. In case of the Pakistani tests, the answers would be more specific and they would point to India as the main culprit. Further, in both cases there would be very strong internal political compulsions. Now that the tests have confirmed/established the nuclear weapon capability (or actual weapon status), it may be safe to presume that the nations have achieved whatever minimal nuclear ambitions they had cherished.

The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 represented a demonstration of capabilities—technological and political. Technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of access to advanced technologies that India experienced/endured over the years.<sup>28</sup> The political capability represented the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7 regime. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent Third World. It is at that level that both, the Indian and Pakistani tests, demonstrate a commonality of approaches.

The Draft outline of Indian Nuclear Doctrine released on 17 August 1999 argued for autonomy in decision making about security for India. It takes the long established Indian line that security is an integral part of India's developmental process. It expresses concerns about the possible disruption of peace and stability and the consequent need to create a deterrence capability to ensure the pursuit of development. It argued that in the absence of a global nuclear disarmament policy, India's strategic interests required an effective credible deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability, should the deterrence fail. It continues to hold on to the 'no first use doctrine' and the civilian control of nuclear decision- making.<sup>29</sup>

The utility of nuclear deterrence (at whatever level) between India and Pakistan may be still unclear. However, the Kargil conflict presented a threshold (a 'glass ceiling', to borrow from feminist terminology) beyond which the two powers may not be able to escalate their conflict. This threshold, in the form of the Line of Control was adhered to by India and was imposed by the United States and China on Pakistan. In the short run, one may have to make a distinction

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<sup>28</sup> Raja Menon. (2000). A Nuclear Strategy for India. New Delhi: Sage publication

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

between conventional security considerations including border conflicts and internal security problems, and nuclear strategies. Therefore, there is the need to reinstate the nuclear dialogue of 1985 that sought to create an agreement on not attacking each other's nuclear installations. This can now be supplemented by a declaration on 'no-first-use' policy.

Both India and Pakistan would have to stress on the need to develop their peaceful- uses programme for their economic and industrial growth. This may require the two countries to bargain with the developed world for the transfer of advance technology. The threat of sanctions on dual use technologies and the limited room for negotiations make it necessary for India and Pakistan to pool their resources for bargaining with the developed countries.

### **Terrorism**

The conflict between India and Pakistan for control over Kashmir has had a direct bearing on the issue of terrorism, both regionally and internationally. The conflict, which resulted in three full-fledged wars between the two countries in 1947, 1965 & 1971, has had a dangerous outcome in the form of growth of terrorism in the region. After being humbled in the three wars with India, Pakistan realized the weaknesses of its military defence. The 1947 and the 1965 wars were fought by the two nations to directly assert their respective control over Kashmir. The 1971 war, which was fought in the eastern sector, was about the secession of the eastern wing/region of Pakistan (which became the independent nation of Bangladesh in 1971) from the western mainland. The war, however, considerably undermined Pakistan's claim on Kashmir, which was based on religion. East Pakistan, like Kashmir, had a predominantly Muslim population. It became evident that Pakistan had to "find new allies to fight the asymmetric warfare against India".<sup>30</sup> Subsequently, in the 1990s, a new trend of external insurgency began in the Kashmir after the end of the cold war, apparently with the tacit support of the Pakistani Intelligence Agency (ISI).<sup>31</sup> The insurgent groups like, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), which were earlier members of the Afghan Mujahideen group - Muslims involved in Jihad (Holy War) - assumed distinct

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<sup>30</sup>Reidel, B. (2008). Pakistan: The Critical Battlefield. *Current History*, 107(712).

<sup>31</sup> Cold War was an ideological war between the United States of America (sponsoring capitalism and free market enterprise) and the former Soviet Union (adhering communism). Both the powers desired to spread their respective ideologies and establish their supremacy in the world politics. The cold war began in 1947, after the Second World War, and ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology



group identities and became active in fighting for the freedom of Kashmir. During the Cold War, the Mujahideen fought against the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Once the Cold War ended, the Mujahideen redirected their attention to Kashmir with their growing empathy for the Pakistani claims on the region. In the 1990s, there was a series of terrorist attacks in India, which began in Kashmir and then gradually spread to other regions by the year 2000 - the Delhi parliamentary attack in 2001, Bangalore bombings in 2006 and more recently the Mumbai attacks in 2008. In addition, a new international development during this period gave the Mujahideen a new rationale and a new focus for Jihad, along with the war in Kashmir. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent role played by the US and the rest of the western world<sup>32</sup> in the 1991 Gulf War resulted in an anti-west rhetoric in the Mujahideen circles./ among mujahideens. The west was implicated/ accused/ criticized of trying to take control of the Gulf region and was also criticized for violating the Muslim faith by stationing soldiers from the west in the Muslim holy land. As a result, a Mujahideen group, Al-Qaeda, orchestrated a series of attacks against the west on the western territories and on western locations worldwide, to express their resentment. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, USS Cole in 2000, 9-11 in 2001, 2004 Madrid train bombings and 2005 London underground train attacks, were all outcomes of the same anti west agenda/rhetoric. At the core of these attacks has been the role played by the Mujahideen groups. Although these groups operate under different names, they all have often worked in collusion with each other. The operations of these groups and the terrorist acts undertaken by them have had unpleasant regional and global consequences.

In a world forever changed by the infamous September 11 attacks, the most urgent threat/one of the most urgent threats to lasting peace is the growing mistrust between Pakistan and India. It is commonly understood that the tribal areas crisscrossing Afghanistan and Pakistan are a breeding ground for terrorists. India has grave concerns of the spill over of radical extremists from this region crossing into the Kashmir region. Response of the US to the September 11 attacks confronted the political leadership of both Pakistan and India with unique challenges and opportunities. Pakistan had to quickly choose whether it would become an enemy of the U.S. and risk the expected consequences, or side with it, and confront its own Islamic-

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<sup>32</sup>Primarily the countries from Western Europe and also countries from other lands, especially from the Americas, who have adopted the western European culture.



fundamentalist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It chose to side with the U.S. on its invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan decided to join because of predictable economic incentives, the need to save its strategic assets and salvaging its Kashmir policy from total destruction. India on its part was prompt in offering its support in the hope that it can fight its own cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan, under the banner of US led “Global War on Terror”. India wanted the U.S. to categorize all Islamist resistance groups in Kashmir as "cross border terrorism" and it wanted endorsement for its efforts to crush them. But Indian aspirations were not realized/recognized/acknowledged by the US to the expectations of India. India watched with concern as Pakistan again emerged as a frontline state in the U.S. led war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan became the battleground for the American led “Global War on Terrorism”, with Pakistan as an important ally of the US in Afghanistan. Tensions between long-time rivals in the region have bubbled beneath the surface in Afghanistan as “war on terror” has captured most of the attention. India offered unconditional support to the US in the latter’s “War on Terror” in Afghanistan hoping to not only minimize Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and ensure that Afghanistan does not become a source of terrorism against India, but also with long-term geo-strategic interests including peace and security in the region. India and Pakistan have been locked in a bitter rivalry with decades-old roots that have almost erupted into outright war several times. In the post-9/11 world, the threat is even greater as the conflict has, on multiple occasions, threatened to escalate into nuclear war. With the 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and the Mumbai attacks in 2008, relationship between the two countries was further worsened as India accused Pakistan for these attacks. On the other hand, Pakistan has been accusing India for internal disturbances and insurgency in the tribal areas of Sind and Baluchistan. Both the countries are playing the war of misperceptions. Since 2014, a new terrorist group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has emerged in the tribal areas of Pakistan to threaten Pakistan’s political institutions. The Pakistani leadership has often accused India of supplying arms and funding to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan who are resorting to terrorist acts against Pakistan, because of Pakistan’s support to the US war on terrorism. In the wake of recent military tensions between Pakistan-India over cross-border firings, it is of utmost importance to defuse tensions by bringing both sides together to discuss the impasse, leading to a resumption of a peace dialogue which has remained suspended since Mumbai attacks in 2008.



## ROLE OF EXTRA REGIONAL FACTORS

The influence of external powers such as China, Russia and western countries including the USA in South Asia region remained a matter of discussion because intense rivalry between two big South Asian powers India and Pakistan always attracted the external power to take an advantage of their rivalry. Therefore, Indo-Pak bitter rivalry was exploited by external powers many times during the period of cold war politics. After partition, Pakistan started to counter the suspected Indian threat by building its military strength and maintaining relations with great powers which came on screen when it concluded a Military Security Pact with the US in 1954 which is considered as a dramatic change in the South Asia Geopolitics. The US used Pakistan in its containment policy of communism and provided it the first high performance aircraft including F-86 Sabres and 12 F-104 interceptors and hundreds of World War I and Korean War vintage tanks which was against the interests of India and regional bilateral issues. Prime Minister Nehru perceived the involvement of external forces could result into Cold War politics in South Asia region.<sup>33</sup>

In response to this, India had started purchasing arms and ammunitions from anti-American forces. In early years of its independence, India got almost fifteen Ordinary Factories from the British India in 1947 which were outdated and useless. Nevertheless, the UK was the first priority/country in the list of weapon suppliers. It was later replaced by France because it was easy for India to replace the spare parts from the original source which was believed to be the attribution to its NAM (Non-aligned Movement) Policy of keeping away from joining any alliance either with the USA or USSR.<sup>34</sup> A sudden change came in South Asia's political stability in May 1960 when the Soviet Union Russia shot down a U-2 spy plane of America which had taken off from a Pakistani base in accordance with some report and resulted in issuance of protest notes by the Soviets because the USSR felt that it had a direct threat on their security. It is also believed that the USSR had started taking interest in the region, as a result India and Soviet came closer to each other and India had accepted to purchase arms from the USSR in response to the US arms aid given to Pakistan.

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<sup>33</sup>Thapliyal Sangeeta, Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers. IDSA. <http://www.idsa-india.org/anoc8-8.html>. Date of Access 12.11.2014 (2008)

<sup>34</sup>Chaudhury Rahul Roy, The United States' role and influence on the India-Pakistan conflict. Disarmament Forum, 31-39 (2004)

Thus, views of most of senior officials from the West were not favourable towards India which made most Indian politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals suspicious of the US's unusual reaction and intentions on every issue between India and Pakistan in South Asia. Even, during the several discussions on the issue of Kashmir, Britain and the US, UN and other western powers supported Pakistan's point of view because of its alliance with SEATO, CENTO military pacts. Not surprisingly, the US was aware of Pakistan's warfare and intentions towards India and was always convinced that its weapon supply to Pakistan was not being used against it. However, that has been proven wrong several times including the three wars in 1965, 1971 and 1999 Kargil as it has always helped Pakistan against the Indian interests even today in early twenty first century.<sup>35</sup> The second front against India is China who has been supportive of Pakistan on Kashmir issue. China has border demarcation problems with India which led to war in 1962 between them. One side, China is of view that developing its own nuclear weapons is the sovereign right of any nation state in the world but on the other side its reaction was not good when India conducted nuclear tests and wanted the US to take hard steps against this. It is doubtless that India, Pakistan and China are the three countries equipped with Nuclear WMD. Pakistan is the only country who insisted for their first use option to complicate the situation, but India and China has no such intention and are ready for retaliatory usage of these weapons if they are attacked. China had provided a design of nuclear weapons and also facilitated their testing for satisfying Pakistan's burning desire for an Islamic bomb. Thus, China has become Pakistan's largest supplier of conventional weapons including fighter planes. It is also seen that whenever Pakistan came under international pressure or underwent any problems it always tried to resort to its powerful friends like China and USA. It was evident when Pakistan went to China for assistance and advice after it felt pressure of Indian security forces.<sup>36</sup> Thus, growing relationship of Pakistan and China and China's increasing infiltration in Ladakh area has now become a matter of concern for India's security.

Russia, which has always maintained friendly relations with India, has a great influence on Indo-Pak relations. The strengthening of Indo-Soviet relations resulted in the deterioration of China-Soviet and China-India relations. India started purchasing transport planes and helicopters in Indian currency from the USSR in the wake of the Taliban uprisings in 1959.

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<sup>35</sup> Singh U.V., *Indo-Pak Relations: Glamour, Drama or Diplomacy?*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, (2012)

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

During the Sino-India war in 1962, Russia remained neutral as it was in a difficult position either to support Communist China or its democratic friend India. In that situation, the US stood by India against China and sent twelve C-130 Hercules transport planes with the troops to India which were helpful in transporting military personnel and materials on the mountainous borders<sup>37</sup>. In this way, Russia kept its interest safe in the Sino-Indian conflict by being neutral.

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Russia played the role of a peacemaker which gave Soviet Russia an opportunity to be exposed to South Asia. The US did not intervene in this war as it was engaged in a war with Vietnam. The war ended on 22nd September as a result of Tashkent agreement in which both agreed for making good relations in accordance with the UN charter to reach the pre-war positions. Nevertheless, none of two countries in real sense were happy with the Tashkent agreement due to their different opinions. On the whole, Soviet Union's delicate attempts to develop closeness with Pakistan after Tashkent agreement remained unfavourable as the agreement was not liked by Pakistan. Soon after, Pakistan's anti-Bengal policies (then East Pakistan) gave birth to the 1971 war<sup>38</sup>. During the period of the Indo-Pak war of 1971 arising out of Bangladesh liberation issue/East Pakistan, Russia assisted India after it failed to gain support from the US. Consequently, India had signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with Soviet Union Russia which was a shocking news for America due to their fear of expansion of Soviet Union in South Asia region and against America's proxy involvement in the war with selfish interests<sup>39</sup>. Thus, differences in the supportive manners of superpowers in relation to Indo-Pak conflicts affected their relations to a great extent.

It is doubtless that defence expenditure increased tremendously soon after the war as both countries of the South Asian subcontinent started to give more importance to self-reliance in armaments and weapons and accrued weapons from all sources available in the world. The US became big supplier of air-craft and air-field equipment to Pakistan to pursue the policy of containment of communism. India, on the other hand became a big purchaser of sophisticated

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<sup>37</sup>Thapliyal Sangeeta, Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers. IDSA.  
<http://www.idsa-india.org/anoct8-8.html>. Date of Access 12.11.2014 (2008)

<sup>38</sup> Singh U.V., *Indi-Pak Relations: Glamour, Drama or Diplomacy?* . New Delhi: Pentagon Press, (2012)

<sup>39</sup> Singh U.V., *Indi-Pak Relations: Glamour, Drama or Diplomacy?* . New Delhi: Pentagon Press, (2012)

weapons from the former USSR. Consequently, Soviet Russia had made its presence in Afghanistan for making its influence in the South Asia region. Apart from this, Pakistan also received inferior weapons from China<sup>40</sup>. It is seen that, India has adopted a policy of nonalignment (NAM) and did not join any alliance and not accept military aid either from the US or from the Soviet Union. Under the system of planned economy, India did not open its economy to the US investment which changed after it adopted policy of economic liberalization in 1991<sup>41</sup>. It is also noted that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan did not much affect the shared interests between the US and Pakistan. But now the US is more worried about the ever growing influence/ of China in the region which is inspired by various military and economic factors. Similarly, relations between India and the US are also improving in the wake of economic development and liberalization of Indian economy as it could provide a big market for the US companies. Simultaneously, Russian policy in the region is also undergoing some changes as it also started to develop its relations with Pakistan, in spite of its pledge to respect the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India<sup>42</sup>. China is still supposed to be the major player in providing arms to Pakistan as its dependency on the US arms supply has reduced after the 1971 Indo-Pak war.

It is also seen that, in the recent years relations between India and China are moving towards normalization, but its growing relations with Pakistan in the field of defence is a major concern for India.<sup>43</sup> Thus, it creates a complex situation for India to maintain cordial relations with China and Pakistan for regional stability.

## **ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONSHIP**

Several attempts have been made to improve their relationships in which both countries failed to build peace and cooperation in the region. Given below the Shimla agreement, Agra

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<sup>40</sup>Thapliyal Sangeeta, Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers. IDSA.  
<http://www.idsa-india.org/anoct8-8.html>. Date of Access 12.11.2014 (2008)

<sup>41</sup> Johnson Donald, India-Pakistan Relations: A 50-Year History. Asia Society,  
<http://asiasociety.org/asia/indiapakistan-relations-50-year-history>. Date of Access 27.11.2014 (2014)

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Thapliyal Sangeeta, Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers. IDSA.  
<http://www.idsa-india.org/anoct8-8.html>. Date of Access 12.11.2014 (2008)

agreement and Lahore declaration are some of significant efforts which have been made in the direction to improve their relationships:

**Tashkent Declaration:** This agreement has already been discussed. It was a peace agreement between India and Pakistan which was signed on January 10, 1966, as result of the Indo-Pak war of 1965. The great powers intervened into the agreement and pushed both nations to a cease fire to bring peace in the region. However, the agreement was criticized in India because it did not contain any renunciation of guerrilla warfare in Kashmir or no-war pact<sup>44</sup>. Thus, discussions were unsuccessful and no result was achieved during the declaration.

**Shimla Agreement:** India and Pakistan signed the Shimla agreement on July 2, 1972 marking the end of Indo-Pak war of 1971 which led to the independence of Bangladesh (earlier East Pakistan). The agreement was concluded in order to end the conflict and confrontation which hindered their relations for making peaceful environment in the region. This agreement was also about to promote territorial integrity, political independence, sovereign equality and to respect national security of each other<sup>45</sup>. However this agreement failed to prevent their armed conflicts when this agreement was violated by Pakistan during the Kargil War in 1999 and subsequent infiltration made by Pakistan in Indian Territory.

**Lahore Declaration:** It is a historical bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan which is also called a second nuclear control treaty, signed on February 1999 and also ratified by the parliaments of both countries to overcome the historically strained bilateral relations<sup>46</sup>. It also added a joint commitment to take major steps towards avoiding the Kashmir conflict and other confidence building measures such as avoiding the misuse of nuclear weapons leading to nuclear war between two nations in the future. But the outbreak of the Kargil war in May 1999 further strained their relations which resulted in the violation of the treaty and exacerbated the

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<sup>44</sup>Syed Muzaffar H., Indo-Pak Relations. New Delhi: Orange Books International, (2012)

<sup>45</sup> Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India . “Shimla Agreement”. Ministry of External affairs: Government of India . [http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/5541/Simla+Agreement.\(1972\)](http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/5541/Simla+Agreement.(1972))

<sup>46</sup> Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, Lahore Declaration February, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India . [http://mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999.\(1999\)](http://mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999.(1999))



doubts over the future of Indo-Pak relationships<sup>47</sup>. Thus, the treaty also remained a subject of violation and exemplified the lack of commitment in negotiations between both countries.

**Agra Summit:** This was a two day historic summit meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan which was held on July 14-16, 2001 in order to propose the resolution of their long standing issues; Kashmir issue, economic cooperation and military confidence in particular to reduce the threat of nuclear arsenals and cross-border terrorism. However, the political dialogue collapsed and a treaty could not be signed as the leaders from New Delhi (P.M. Atal Behari Vajpayee) and Islamabad (President Pervez Musharraf) couldn't arrive at an agreement over certain issues.<sup>48</sup>. Thus, due to the absence of sincere talk, this attempt to improve relationship could not succeed.

### **ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN RESOLVING THEIR DISPUTES:**

It is doubtless that United Nations has been playing a great role in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan since their partition. The UN adopted the resolution on January 5, 1949 in the wake of Indo-Pak war of 1947-48 and brokered cease-fire which ordered Pakistan to withdraw its regular/irregular forces and allowed India to preserve law and order in the state and maintain the necessary minimum presence of its security forces. In this line, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was deployed for monitoring activities on the ceasefire line which is currently known as the Line of Control<sup>49</sup>. Thus, the UN played a decisive role in solving the conflict while following the international norms and the UN charter. The next Indo-Pak war took place in 1965 which is also called a second war over Kashmir after 1947. It was the result of Operation Gibraltar by Pakistan which was especially planned to push Pakistani forces into the territory of Indian occupied Kashmir against the Indian rule. This war was also ended with a UN intervention which called for an unconditional ceasefire which subsequently led to the Tashkent Declaration<sup>50</sup>. Thus, in this war Pakistan was defeated clearly

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<sup>47</sup> Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, Lahore Declaration February, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India.

<http://mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999>. Date of Access 2.12.2014 (1999)

<sup>48</sup>Sarma A., Umakantha. The Agra summit and thereafter.

The Hindu. <http://www.thehindu.com/2001/07/31/stories/13310611.htm>. (2001)

<sup>49</sup>Chaudhury Rahul Roy, The United States' role and influence on the India-Pakistan conflict. Disarmament Forum, 31-39 (2004)

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

by India as the UN intervened. The United Nations also directed for ceasefire and gave order to withdraw armed forces when India and Pakistan fought the third Indo-Pak war in 1971 for which the resolution was introduced by the then US ambassador George H.W. Bush to the United Nations Security Council<sup>51</sup>. However, it is seen that whenever any conflict occurred between India and Pakistan, Pakistan ran to/looked upto the United Nations for help in most cases. For example in case of the recent infiltration by Pakistan in 2014, to which India gave a strong counter response as a result Pakistan ran to the United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP, established by United Nations Security Council resolution) over the issue of Line of Control ceasefire violation by India and asked the UN to intervene in the matter. On this matter, India made a comment that UNMOGIP is losing its importance as it was earlier<sup>52</sup>. It is also seen that many nations and scholars are of the view that the issue should be left for India and Pakistan to resolve and they should solve this cooperatively/amicably. Nevertheless, history indicates that India and Pakistan cannot ignore the role of United Nations which continues to facilitate uninterrupted peace and cooperation in the region.

### **Other Peace-building Measures:**

There are other peace and confidence building measures which have been adopted by both the countries in order to settle their disputes and conflicts such as Delhi-Lahore Bus Service, Samjhauta Express, SAARC regional cooperation, Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline (IPI), sports etc. However both countries failed in normalizing and strengthening relations due to their long standing rivalry and unresolved conflicts.

### **FUTURE PROSPECTS**

There is no doubt that people on both sides want contact, not distance. According to Kuldip Nayar; “When the border was thrown open for a day after the eight and nine years of independence. It was for a hockey match between India and Pakistan at Lahore. No passport was required. People from India had to show some identification papers. Every Indian had very warm welcome from their side that touched everybody’s heart. It looked as if separated friends had met. Every restaurants and eating shops did not charge money from Indians. Tongas,

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<sup>51</sup>Arpi Claude, 1971 War: How the US tried to corner India.  
<http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/26claud.htm>. (2006)

<sup>52</sup> <http://www.rediff.com/news/report/pakistan-approachesun-body-over-loc-issue/20141007.htm>. (2014)



rickshaws and taxis carried them free.” In the same way we started lightning candles at Wagah border after forty ninth year of independence. After lighting candles at midnight right at the gate on border, the official ceremony is over. But people continue to stay there till the early hours of the morning. In 2006, the year of writing, it had to be seen to be believed. A huge number of people gathered at the same border nearly 500,000 people had only one slogan on their lips: “Hindustan Pakistan dosti zindabad” (long live India-Pakistan friendship).<sup>53</sup> This shows that people of both states want always live together, then why government of both states cannot be engaged for permanent peace of the subcontinent.

There were quite a few reasons at this time which gave confidence to the governments of both countries to embark on a new peace process. First, both countries had tried everything including war and mobilization of troops to force the other to accept its version of Kashmir Settlement, but they failed at it. Secondly, nuclear parity in South Asia meant that war was almost impossible. Thirdly, The economies of both the countries were doing very well at this time and the rising middle classes in both countries desired peace for continued growth. US think-tank has proposed a dialogue between India and the Pakistan Army. The proposal has some merit to the extent that the influence of the army is a stark reality in Pakistan’s policy. Because General Zia-ul-Haq once said that “It would be better off in settling Kashmir and other matters with the army because if and when democracy returned to Pakistan India would have problem. It is true that New Delhi has not reached anywhere with the “democratic” government in Islamabad. But it is equally true that the army never left Pakistan alone. There is no movement on any issue, reportedly because of the army’s disinterest”.<sup>54</sup>

This necessitated an alternative strategy for a solution of the Kashmir dispute which would satisfy the people of Kashmir, India and Pakistan. That being the case, it was clear that any solution we found would not be an ideal one from the perspective of all Kashmiri’s, Pakistani’s, and Indians. It could only be the best possible alternative under the given circumstances. The major features of draft Kashmir agreement involved a gradual demilitarization as the situation improved, self-governance and a joint mechanism involving Kashmiris from both sides as well

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<sup>53</sup>Kuldip Nayar “People to People Contact” pp.88-89.

<sup>54</sup>The Tribune, October 10 ,2011.



as the presence of Pakistani and Indian representatives in some form or the other. The purpose was to improve the comfort level of Kashmiris.<sup>55</sup>

The naval authorities on both sides have also established a hotline mainly to avoid arresting fishermen from either side who stray accidentally into each other's waters, and which has considerably reduced arrests on both sides. The coast guard authorities on both sides are now debating the possibility of holding joint search and rescue operations and collaborating in marine pollution control.<sup>56</sup> The positive steps from the two sides has couched the reluctance of Pakistan to move forward on a range of conventional military CBMs that would call for a structured interaction and communication between two military establishments.

One would think that exchange of intelligence information among friendly agencies was occurring as a matter of course to help fill information gaps, to verify of sources and substance, and to get a "second opinion". However, as any report on intelligence reform or failures shows, the absence of coordination, even among their own agencies remains problematic. When countries are faced with common external or internal threats, exchange of mutually beneficial information might not only be thinkable but also desirable, even prudent. Even in the worst days of Cold War, the CIA and KGB never ceased contacts, even though open declared officers in each other's capitals. Intelligence links between neighbours are obviously desirable. It is better to institutionalize them now, rather than trying to activate them in times of crisis. Intelligence links can succeed where all others fail. What agencies can achieve is not at times even conceivable in political or diplomatic channels. As the two sides develop trust and rapport, the canvass is bound to expand. One day even trials might become possible.<sup>57</sup>

It may strange and perhaps even unbelievable that as late as 1962, the India and Pakistan Navy used to exercise together under the banner of joint exercise held at and off Tricomalee(SriLanka), Known as JET for short. These exercises were conducted annually by the British as a part of the commonwealth Naval exercises. Other Navies that took part were form Australia, Canada, Sri Lanka, and, of course, the Royal Navy from UK. Alas, all this came to an end after 1965 war of India-Pakistan. In 1992 India held a very successful

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<sup>55</sup>The Times of India, February 17, 2011

<sup>56</sup>Samarjit Ghosh, "India-Pakistan Relations: Composite Dialogue in Stasis" in D. Suba Chandran and Jabin T. Jacob(eds.), India's Foreign Policy Old Problems, New Challenges, MacMillan, Delhi, 2011.

<sup>57</sup>The Hindu, July 14, 2011.



International seminar under the aegis of the Navy Foundation, titled “Challenges and opportunities in the Indian Ocean for the next century.” The ships of both India and Pakistan worked tighter to render help after Tsunami waves hit Maldives. The two armies had worked under the United Nation command during peace keeping operations in Somalia, Congo and elsewhere. There is no reason why this kind of synergy cannot be extended in the future to work towards regional security.<sup>58</sup>

## CONCLUSION

It is doubtless that Indo-Pak relations have been undergoing difficulties and tragedies even after more than six decades of their partition/independence. Exploring the possibilities of peace and cooperation between the two countries remained a big challenge for India. It is also a well-known fact that the rivalry between both is not in favour of anyone’s advantage and cannot bear fruit. It is seen that confrontation and disputes between India and Pakistan influenced the regional stability and geopolitics as South Asia has become a hub of external powers’ involvements/ interventions, both during and after the cold war era. The root causes of India Pakistan conflicts and confrontation are supposed to be their undemocratic partition, territorial disputes and communal antagonism on ethnic lines. Kashmir is believed to be the main source of confrontation between the two countries which is a Muslim majority area as being claimed by Pakistan. This is why non-state actors like terrorist groups are taking advantage of their conflicts. No doubt, several attempts have been made to restore their relationships such as Tashkent Declaration, Shimla Summit, Lahore Declaration, Agra agreement, Lahore Bus services, Samjauta Express, sports etc. but both countries remained unsuccessful in achieving their goals and still have not learnt from their past. Though, the United Nations has been playing a good role but it needs to be more active in view of the rapidly changing equations of Indo-Pak relationship. It is also observed that India and Pakistan are nuclear states but they did not fight any nuclear war as of now as they understand that a nuclear war cannot be the sole solution of their bilateral problems other than a big loss for both countries. Both countries need to learn from the past as they should avoid the biasness in their relations. It must be determined that India and Pakistan do not let external powers to exploit their relations.

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<sup>58</sup>Laxminarayan Ramdas, “Sustaining India-Pakistan Peace: Challenges for Civil society and Military.” op. cit., no.4



The tension and conflicts between India and Pakistan are historical, but can be solved through bilateral, multilateral and unilateral relations establishments and continued peaceful dialogue between both countries. However, it is difficult task to investigate/explore peaceful and confidence building solutions for the two nuclear-armed powers in South Asia. But Kashmir, due to its geo-strategic location, is going to be the deciding factor of either normalizing or destabilizing Indo-Pak relations in the future. It is also evident that the conflict situation and communal antagonism of the region has created a space for external powers who have been exploiting Indo-Pak disputes for their selfish interests. This continued not only during the cold war period but even today they are taking advantage of this situation because after the end of cold war the US, Russia and China have experienced a great shift in their policies toward the region. In spite of this, several measures have been adopted till now to settle and normalize Indo-Pak relations but nothing could be achieved successfully. In this way, if both nations want to achieve the desired situation in the region, they need mutual cooperation putting a stop to internal bottlenecks rather than relying on external factors. If it comes true, then it will be the golden period of South Asia History.

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